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█ Abstract In the context of nineteenth-century philosophical reflection, Francesco Bonatelli (1830-1911) 
set himself the following goal: to defend the pillars of Spiritualism (the existence of a human subject with 
intellectual or supra-sensitive cognitive functions) and ontology (the notions of esse and substantia) 
through an careful examination of psychic contents and consciousness, while closely contesting both the 
psychology and the psychophysiology of Positivism (without rejecting its results in toto) and Spiritualism 
itself (with all its uncritical assumptions and unnecessary metaphysical speculations). In works such as 
Pensiero e conoscenza (1864), La coscienza e il meccanesimo interiore (1872), and Percezione e pensiero 
(1892-1895) Bonatelli puts forward his “critical experience-grounded philosophy” and proposes an origi-
nal solution to the problem of the nature of the subject, (self-)consciousness and its unity, using an analy-
sis of “sentiments” to reveal the inseparable tangle of the cognitive and ontological dimensions of the self. 
KEYWORDS: Positivism; Consciousness; Self-consciousness; Actus essendi; Substance; Gnoseology 
 
█ Riassunto Francesco Bonatelli: un approccio critico (a base sperimentale) alla coscienza e al soggetto umano 
tra spiritualismo e positivismo – Nel contesto della riflessione filosofica dell’Ottocento, Francesco Bonatelli 
(1830-1911) scelse come proprio ufficio la difesa dei capisaldi dello spiritualismo (l’esistenza di un sogget-
to umano dotato di funzioni cognitive intellettive o sovra-sensitive) e dell’ontologia (le nozioni di esse e di 
substantia), mediante un attento esame dei contenuti psichici e della coscienza stessa, in un serrato con-
fronto con la psicologia e psicofisiologia del positivismo (senza rifiutarne in blocco i risultati) e con lo spi-
ritualismo stesso (con tutte le sue acritiche assunzioni e superfetazioni metafisiche). In opere come Pensie-
ro e conoscenza (1864), La coscienza e il meccanesimo interiore (1872) e Percezione e pensiero (1892-1895), 
Bonatelli espose la propria “filosofia critica a base sperimentale” e propose una soluzione originale al pro-
blema della natura del soggetto, della coscienza (come auto-coscienza) e della sua unità, mostrando come 
nell’analisi dei sentimenti si riveli l’inscindibile intreccio delle due dimensioni, cognitiva e ontologica, 
dell’io. 
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█  Introduction: The long-term battle about 
self and consciousness 
 
THE LAST TWENTY YEARS OF the eighteenth 
century were characterised by Kant’s demoli-
tion of metaphysics, while the nineteenth 
century began in the name of metaphysics’ 
revenge, that is the urgent need to establish 
grounds for the phenomenal level: it was a 
kind of philosophical Restoration in which 
German Idealism was not the only protago-
nist, but also some “independent” philoso-
phers such as Herbart and Schopenhauer or, 
in the French context, Maine de Biran and 
Victor Cousin, to mention just a few. 
By contrast, from the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, Positivism started a new fight against 
metaphysics, which it accused of crushing re-
ality, preferring abstract concepts and uni-
versal principles to concrete and irrefutable 
facts. According to the definition of “Positiv-
ism” given by André Lalande in the Vocabu-
laire technique et critique de la philosophie, 
there are four issues which characterise Posi-
tivism (beyond various centrifugal forces): 
 
(1) Only the knowledge of “facts” is fruit-
ful; (2) only the experimental sciences give 
a real standard of certainty; (3) continuous 
connection with experience and refusal of 
the a priori are the only security and safe-
guards against mistakes; (4) the under-
standing can grasp only relations and laws.1 
 
It is not, in fact, a matter of assuming sci-
ence as a methodological reference: Positiv-
ism is characterised by a precise frame of 
mind, which is based on “faith” in the scienc-
es and in the application of the outcomes of 
scientific enquiries concerning the natural 
world and the subject.  
Faced with both the development of sci-
ences (which undoubtedly played an im-
portant role in promoting the above-
mentioned “positivistic frame of mind”)2 and 
the gradual strengthening of Positivism, trust 
in the positivity of ontology and metaphysics, 
among the followers of Italian philosophers – 
such as Vincenzo Gioberti, Antonio Rosmini 
and Terenzio Mamiani – had become a reas-
suring leitmotiv repeated with obstinacy, ra-
ther than a well-founded assertion. This is 
particularly the case if one considers the fact 
that spiritualistic philosophy (Italian or oth-
er) was unable to descend to the same level as 
the positivists and respond in the positivists’ 
own language. 
Now, focusing on the central topic of this 
paper, Francesco Bonatelli (1830-1911) chose 
to defend the tenets of both Spiritualism and 
ontology by means of a careful examination of 
psychic contents and consciousness. From the 
brief early essay Sulla sensazione (1852) [On 
Sensation] to the last pamphlet, Sulla conosci-
bilità dell’Io (1909) [On the Knowableness of 
the Self], passing through his main works, 
such as Pensiero e conoscenza (1864) [Think-
ing and Knowledge], La coscienza e il mecca-
nesimo interiore (1872) [Consciousness and 
Inner Mechanism], Discussioni gnoseologiche 
(1885) [Gnoseological Discussions], Percezione 
e pensiero [Perception and Thinking] (3 vols., 
published in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century), and Studi d’epistemologia (1905) 
[Studies on Epistemology], he engaged in an 
intense debate with positivistic psychology 
and psychophysiology. He did not totally re-
ject their results, but conducted a thorough 
discernment of what is actually furnished by 
the observation of consciousness and what is, 
instead, introduced as an interpretation of 
the real “positive data” in the spirit of adhe-
sion to a system, thereby performing an illicit 
«castration» of the experience.3  
At the same time, Bonatelli showed he 
was not in full agreement even with spiritual-
istic philosophy itself, since it was not ex-
empt from Bonatelli’s experience-based criti-
cism (quite a different criticism from that of 
Kant, or Mach’s empirio-criticism, and much 
more similar to Brentano’s psychology as well 
as to phenomenology, because it is capable of 
an integral openness to experience). Bonatel-
li’s decisive methodological rejection of the 
concepts of soul and faculties, and his denial 
of innatism (and, perhaps, also of apriorism, 
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which had been a “step forward” compared 
to radical innatism),4 are examples of this 
harsh filtering of Spiritualism from each and 
every uncritical assumption and unnecessary 
metaphysical speculations.5 
My purpose is to underline the fact that 
Bonatelli’s critical gnoseology resulted in a 
theory of consciousness (and its reflexive es-
sence), which could be quite useful for the 
psycho-philosophical reflections of the pre-
sent day in two ways: on the one hand, it is 
able to address the complex nature of the 
human being, by virtue of rejecting any at-
tempt at reductionism (indirectly warning 
against some contradictions concealed in the 
uncritical adoption of the neurophysiological 
approach in studying the self and conscious-
ness); on the other hand, having brought to 
light some aspects of the “mode of being” of 
the self, it can provide some interesting sug-
gestions in the context of current philosophi-
cal realism (preventing the need for any re-
sponse to constructivism turning into an in-
genuous “common sense realism”). 
 
█  Psychological unity of consciousness: 
The first half of “self” 
 
Let us consider the following passage tak-
en from Discussioni gnoseologiche [Gnoseologi-
cal Discussions], in which we can find the in-
tersection and blending of all the topics that 
the Italian philosopher dealt with in his 
works: 
 
The sensations, as we say, are for example 
the red, the green, the hard [...] Or are 
they rather the red seen, the hard 
touched, the sound heard? However, this 
is still not enough; because, even so, we 
are still on the level of abstraction […] 
Seen by whom? Heard by whom? This is 
where forgetfulness and, then, the mis-
take are to be found. If we stop at the first 
abstraction, the subject is limited to the 
abstract unity of sensations. […] If one 
stops at the second abstraction, if in addi-
tion to the content of sensation one also 
assumes the presence of the sensation […], 
the subject is restricted to representing, 
and even this is reduced to a minimum, a 
shadow of activity, the theatre where the 
representations move, which is a less ab-
stract kind of unity than the first one. But 
let’s get to the core of the problem, let’s 
get to the “who”, that is to the living and 
actual subject, to the real unity […]; only 
then shall we grasp the sensation as a real 
and concrete fact, in all its essence.6 
 
Bonatelli hereby proposes a climax 
through which he attempts to lead the reader 
to the reconquest of the subject’s deep unity, 
beyond those individual aspects which the dif-
ferent philosophical systems focused on: we 
can find, in order of appearance, Condillac’s 
Sensism,7 Ardigò’s Positivism (which is, in 
many respects, the French philosopher’s direct 
heir), Humean Empiricism (with the theory 
that the subject is a “bundle” of sensations),8 
and Kantian criticism.9 They are all to blame 
for “abstractions”, for isolating some aspects 
of the unique “knowing event” and then abso-
lutising their value.  
This is an exhortation to comprehend the 
living and actual unity of the subject (that is, 
a unity always in act) which recalls both 
Rosmini’s thought and Lotze’s philosophical 
reflections (these philosophers are Bonatelli’s 
constant landmarks).10 
However, as I stated before, we are going 
to examine the climax: on the one hand, Ar-
digò’s Positivism affirms that a sensation (ei-
ther single or associated, either concrete or 
abstract, namely formed by the confluence or 
superimposition of various distinct sensa-
tions) is characterised by “cognitive self-
sufficiency”, meaning there is an identity of 
the psychic fact with the consciousness of it 
(this means that the psychic experience is a 
self-manifestation of an uninterrupted psy-
chic flow which does not need a knowing 
subject).11 On the other hand, Bonatelli up-
holds a conception according to which per-
ception is a “finding act” (inventio in the et-
ymological sense of the term), whereby the 
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subject is “intentionally directed” to a con-
tent grasped in its structure and in its “being 
in front” of the subject.12 Thus, for Bonatelli, 
the psychic fact or given does not reabsorb 
“the knowing” into itself as Ardigò’s “aìsthe-
ma” did (that’s the meaning of what would 
later be called the “myth of the given”).13  
This seeing/grasping is pre-logical since it 
has an un-conceptual nature (a sort of “origi-
nal offering vision” Bonatelli proposed al-
ready in the essay La coscienza e il mecca-
nesimo interiore [Consciousness and Inner 
Mechanism] (1872), long before Husserl’s 
phenomenology). It is also an intellective 
function: indeed, the structure and the exist-
ence of a given and the structural and exis-
tential relationships, which the subject can 
discern, are all intrinsic elements of concrete 
experimental content, apprehended in an an-
alytical way. In Sentire e conoscere [Sensing 
and Knowing] (1909), Bonatelli says:  
 
Of course, the sensed content exists in the 
sentient subject; the sentient subject is not 
like a dead body or a mineral, that is, rela-
tive to others and nothing for himself [...], 
but the sentient subject, as mere sentient, is 
not aware of the in-existence [in-habitatio] 
of sensed content. [...] Both a horse and a 
man, for example, can be tired; but only a 
man can say, “I’m tired”. And [...] with the 
verb “to say”, I only refer to the internal act 
by which the tiredness is affirmed and rec-
ognized for what it is.14 
 
Well, this thesis of the “act of conscious-
ness” as an original act of inventio, does not 
clash with the other distinctive formulation 
by Bonatelli, according to which the act of 
consciousness is a “judging act” or a “refer-
encing act”, expressed by the formula “A is 
A”. Of course, both the combination of the 
conception of consciousness as an “achro-
matic glass”, which does not alter the content 
given/found, and the act of consciousness as 
a judging act cannot do anything besides 
generate a contradiction.15 However, it is im-
portant to thoroughly understand what Bona-
telli means by “judgment” and “reference” in 
order to show that this contradiction is only 
apparent: the verb “is” in the formula “A is A” 
indicates that A, i.e., the felt sensory stimula-
tion (where “to feel” does not mean “to per-
ceive”, as Bonatelli firmly points out, since 
feeling remains within the limits of a bare sen-
sory life), appears for the first time in the 
psychic field of the subject, thereby acquiring 
cognitive value and becoming “A”, i.e., repre-
sentational content with the characteristics 
that we become aware of. “A” remains itself 
(in fact, the judgment is “A is A”), while tak-
ing on a different, higher, role.16  
Together with this reduplication, that is 
the opposition of the content to itself, the 
original judgment “A is A” also implies the 
opposition of the content to the subject, since 
the former is “present to” the latter, without 
the subject collapsing into the given (positiv-
istically) or vice versa (idealistically).17 Both 
subject and object remain irreducible and 
undisputed protagonists of the “perceiving 
event”: this is what Cornelio Fabro, Italian 
Neo-Scholastic philosopher, towards the 
middle of the twentieth century, called “sub-
ject-object dialectic”.18 
That is why Bonatelli, in the above-
mentioned passage of Discussioni gnoseologiche 
[Gnoseological Discussions] asked «who can 
hear this sound, who can see this colour?». In 
another major work Percezione e pensiero [Per-
ception and Thinking], and especially in its first 
part, La percezione [Perception] (1892), Bona-
telli offers an example taken from the everyday 
life to the reader, a very relevant example for 
the present topic: he remembers that he woke 
up one night and focused on two facts that had 
risen to consciousness, that is, the pulsing of an 
artery and the ticking of a pendulum.  
He then began to reflect upon what it 
meant “to feel” these two contents (contents 
kept “naked” in front of him, writes Bonatelli, 
that is, stripped of any complex knowledge 
which is “known” and not just “perceived”):  
 
I noticed that this appearance, this percipi, 
was what each of these two contents was, 
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that is the latter a “tic-tac” and the former 
a “zum-zum”. Their occasional disap-
pearance was equivalent to their “not be-
ing” and their reappearance was equiva-
lent to their “becoming again”. - To be for 
me! - One can say. Of course; but this “for 
me” was not given in the phenomenon. It 
is clear why Condillac was able to say: the 
statue that perceives a smell [...] considers 
itself an odour. It is a mistake; but we can 
understand it; Condillac observed that in 
the perception of the smell, there is only 
the smell. It is also a mistake, because the 
smell cannot say either “I’m a statue” nor 
“I, the smell, I am” [just as the sensation 
does, in fact, according to Ardigò]. The 
one who says “it is”, is the man, after be-
ing “in the presence” of the smell (and 
“being in the presence” of anything is “to 
be for him”). Therefore, the conscious-
ness of a thing is the existence of that 
thing itself (as a “phenomenon”, that is 
for the conscious subject).19 
 
Of course, this does not mean that all pos-
itivistic objections against both the necessary 
presence of the subject and a psychology fo-
cused on the centrality of the self are hushed-
up. Bonatelli showed he was well-aware of 
the fact that the battle against Positivism 
should be fought on several fronts. 
 
█  Substantial deepness of the unity of con-
sciousness: The second half of “self” 
 
The fifth chapter of Discussioni gnoseologi-
che [Gnoseological Discussions] (1885), which 
is entirely devoted to the question of the ex-
istence and knowability of the self, opens 
with the following statement: 
 
There is no knowledge whose value has 
been more obstinately contested than that 
which relates to our own being. The least 
that is said about this topic, is that the 
subject is as unknown as the outside 
world, or, as Stuart Mill says, that the Self 
is the unknown recipient of the sensa-
tions, just as the bodies are their unknown 
causes. Others go much further: accord-
ing to them, the subject is not only un-
known in his inner nature, but also does 
not actually exist at all; either the sensa-
tion, as the only real being, has the power 
to produce two shams, that is, on the one 
hand that of a sentient self and, on the 
other hand, that of a corporeal substance, 
or matter, assumed to be a real being, or 
even better the only real being […], gener-
ates motion, and motion generates sense, 
and sense generates intellect and the latter 
produces the sham of a sentient and 
thinking subject.20 
 
This criticism does not only concern the 
need for a self/subject who has knowledge, 
but also and more specifically the possibility 
of giving this subject the character of “sub-
stance”, that is a stronger ontological status 
than that of an epiphenomenon of sensations 
or the functions of bodily organs.  
Now, among the philosophers who state 
that the self is unknown, there was, on the 
one hand, Herbart (one of Bonatelli’s main 
landmarks!), who stressed that the concept 
of self-consciousness based on a representa-
tive function is a contradiction in terms 
(since this conception conceals the danger of 
the regressus ad infinitum);21 on the other 
hand, there were Auguste Comte22 and Her-
bert Spencer,23 who both suggested that a 
psychology based on introspection could not 
provide any “objective” knowledge with sci-
entific value, because the stream of psychic 
contents is continuous and always in fieri and 
introspection does not ensure any “distance” 
between the researcher and the object of in-
vestigation. John Stuart Mill, who admitted 
that the subject could not be a “bundle of 
feelings” which recognizes itself as a “bun-
dle”, also concluded that there is a real 
ground for psychic contents, although it is 
unknowable.24  
As for those who denied the reality of the 
self and reduced it to an “unnecessary” crea-
tion of psychic dynamics or brain processes, 
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Roberto Ardigò (1828-1920) was certainly the 
most prominent representative in Italy: the 
“Me” is nothing but a very general “frame” in 
which all possible sensations and association 
chains are organised. It is a bare pattern com-
posed of sensations that differ only in degree 
of distinction, perseverance, and chronologi-
cal priority, so that there is no real distinction 
(if not grounded on habit) between “inside” 
and “outside”, between “Me” and “Not-me”. 
In La psicologia come scienza positiva [Psycho-
logy as Positive Science] (1870), Ardigò writes:  
 
In the beginning, what is now known as 
“outside” and “inside”, was in conscious-
ness without being considered as such: 
[...] the distinction is a habit of the mind 
which was gradually formed.25 
 
According to Ardigò, there is neither a 
single subject with a strong identity, nor an 
absolute unity of consciousness: on the one 
hand, from the psychological point of view, 
there is only an associative chain; on the oth-
er hand, from the organic point of view, there 
is only the uniqueness of the brain and the 
interconnection of its neural areas.26 
Bonatelli’s answer is clear and firm and, 
being in accordance with the approach of ex-
perimental psychology, this reply is also inci-
sive: firstly, the self is actually able to turn its 
attention on itself (showing the character of 
intellective self-transparency), without giving 
rise to a regressum ad infinitum, because this 
infinite reflection is virtually implicit in every 
act of perception and, thus, does not inter-
rupt the psycho-cognitive dynamics.27 Fur-
thermore, an examination of the contents of 
consciousness shows that all psychic givens 
are neither sensations, nor referable to sensa-
tions (just like their aspects: he refers to both 
Ardigò’s and Wundt’s theses, according to 
which pleasure and pain would be the “hedon-
istic quality” or the “tone” of sensations).28  
The sentiments, stresses Bonatelli, as is 
apparent to those who are able to suspend all 
prejudices and only consider what appears to 
consciousness, are original and irreducible to 
the sensitive and imaginative field: indeed, 
the subject is not only the spectator or wit-
ness of the sentiments, since he is intrinsical-
ly involved in psychic contents such as pleas-
ure and pain. In the sentiment, the subject 
reveals itself as a living core, which can give 
to psychic contents and to consciousness, 
too, a radical and deep, intimate unity. This 
is much more than what bare associative 
connections can do. In the second part of 
Percezione e pensiero [Perception and Think-
ing], La percezione interna [Inner Perception] 
(1894), Bonatelli writes: 
 
Let us talk about sentiments. A peculiar 
character by which they are distinguished, 
in particular, from representations (wheth-
er immediate or reproduced) is that senti-
ments immediately and clearly show their 
relationship with the subject. In fact, rep-
resentations may occupy our attention 
exclusively with their content [...] without 
allowing a judgment arise in our con-
sciousness that ascribes them to us as ob-
jects [...] On the psychic horizon, it is pos-
sible that nothing else other than just the 
object appears, leaving in the shadow, as 
it were, its (perceptive) relationship with 
the perceiving subject. However, in the 
case of sentiments, this relationship is al-
ways explicit, because it is not only con-
tained in perceiving them, but it is part of 
what is perceived. [...] If [...] I feel some 
pain, but while it remains alone in the 
field of attention, the perceived object can 
not be reduced to bare pain, to this pain; 
on the contrary, this is MY pain.29 
 
According to Bonatelli, one can reach the 
full and authentic meaning of both the sub-
ject and of consciousness by analysing the 
sentiments; therefore, consciousness be-
comes «not only what is most intimate, most 
personal, most incommunicable, but also the 
active core of our own being».30 
There are two aspects of consciousness: 
one is purely cognitive (the “achromatic glass” 
that does not affect the content: the pure cog-
  Poggi 
 
208 
nitive self) and the other is ontological (what 
the Thomists called the actus essendi, the sub-
stratum of states and actions).  
The analysis of attention clearly shows 
that these two aspects are not juxtaposed, but 
identical, simultaneously present, inseparable 
(although distinguishable), because the sub-
ject’s attention awakens, focuses on a content 
and distinguishes it from others by virtue of 
the sentiment.31 
In the careful examination of the senti-
ment lies the toughest and most positive crit-
icism against both the positivistic demolition 
of the unity of consciousness and Rosmini’s 
unsuccessful efforts to save ontology by 
means of the innate idea of the “absolute and 
universal being”. In keeping with Bonatelli 
and in direct continuity with his outcomes, 
Giuseppe Zamboni (1875-1950), Italian Neo-
Scholastic who was one of Bonatelli’s stu-
dents at the University of Padua (in 1897-
1899),32 described the self (more specifically, 
“myself”) as «the last receptacle of the 
knowledge of being»,33 and titled his main 
work La persona umana. Soggetto autocoscien-
te nell’esperienza integrale. Termine della gno-
seologia. Base della metafisica [The Human 
Person. Self-conscious Subject within the Inte-
gral Experience. Object of the Gnoseology. Basis 
of the Metaphysics] (1940). 
Similarly, Luigi Stefanini (1891-1956), 
summarized his own philosophical personal-
ism in the following sentence from La mia 
prospettiva filosofica [My Philosophical Perspec-
tive] (1950): «No metaphysics can be erected, 
if its first chapter is not psychological».34 That 
means that the metaphysics of being (esse, in 
Aristotelico-Scholastic terms), since it is only 
focused on abstract concepts, should be 
backed by (or grounded on) a thorough analy-
sis of the factual experience of the human per-
son, where we can find the “being” in its actual 
and living manifestation.35  
According to Bonatelli, in the sentiment 
we can find the self-presence and the self-
manifestation of that SUM from which one 
can obtain, by means of abstraction, the idea 
of esse. For this reason, in La coscienza e il 
meccanesimo interiore (1872) [Consciousness 
and Inner Mechanism], Bonatelli states: 
 
We must not mistake the metaphysical 
notion of substance, which the philoso-
pher attains by means of speculations and 
abstractions, for the immediate apprehen-
sion of it, that also the most common 
people possess. [...] I’ve always said that in 
the sentiment man is conscious of his own 
substance, not that in it he can contem-
plate the pure notion of substance. As for 
the desire to go even further [...], when we 
arrive, in any being, at the centre of its 
life, which is the sentiment, one does not 
go any further, and neither does one re-
main there, digging […] where there is 
nothing to dig, or one climbs without real-
ising it and goes back to the upper layers 
of phantoms and concepts taken from the 
phenomenal world. In the sentiment – 
this is the expression that I usually availed 
myself of – we become conscious of our 
reality and substantial unity. Now this [...] 
means that [...] in the sentiment, the sub-
stance is in-itself and, therefore, the con-
sciousness of its own sentiment is the con-
sciousness of what happens not only with-
in the substance itself, but also with the 
full participation of the being in which it 
happens; it is the consciousness of an act 
which proceeds from the substance, […], 
or rather, of an act which ends and ac-
complishes its intention in the origin 
whence it arose, or, even better, it is the 
consciousness of an act which is the prop-
er being of the substance.36 
 
█  Conclusion: The twofold unity of con-
sciousness 
 
In this paper I attempted to highlight the 
originality of Bonatelli’s thought and the rea-
sons why his reflections should now be re-
taken into account: looking beyond some ob-
scurities that undermined reception of his 
thought, we must focus on his proto-
phenomenological approach to consciousness 
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and its contents, which constitutes the ground 
of his eclecticism and his escape from those 
influences he struggled under, from both a lex-
ical and conceptual point of view, due to the 
general context of his time and to key philos-
ophers such as Herbart, Lotze, and Rosmini.  
By means of the examination of what is 
immediately present to consciousness, Bona-
telli can identify the source of both the Posi-
tivistic and Idealistic contradictions concern-
ing perception and redress the balance be-
tween subject and object. However, above all, 
he penetrates the more apparent unity of con-
sciousness, that is the psychological one, to 
find a deeper unity of consciousness which is 
based on the ontological (substantial) unity of 
the subject (so that we can then state that all 
the phenomena of the psychic level exist and 
participate in a person’s life and being – esse).  
Therefore, being substance and becoming 
conscious to himself of his own substantial 
nature,37 the subject is able to approach the 
“objects” of outward perception (that is the 
sensitive and imaginative complexes) en-
dowed with all the ontological concepts 
which he applies as long as experience so al-
lows (by means of analogy).38  
This does not entail drifting into Ideal-
ism, since the role played by the subject (who 
is both protagonist and object of the experi-
ence, together with all his functions, states, 
and acts) has only to rediscover the depth of 
reality giving voice to the whole experience 
and the demands which the latter exhibits 
(demands that would not have manifested 
themselves without the subject and his spe-
cific essence): it is a realism purged of any in-
genuity, therefore a critical realism. 
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